CVE-2017-14838

high

Published 2017-09-28 · Modified 2026-05-13

💬 Discuss on Community ✚ Propose mitigation

CVSS v3

8.8

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS v4 NEW

—

not yet in upstream

VIR risk

9.8

Description

TeamWork Job Links allows Arbitrary File Upload in profileChange and coverChange.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood

92%

Patch ETA

—

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

✚ Propose a mitigation on Community → Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-42795 webapps php text · 2 KB

Ihsan Sencan · 2017-09-26

Job Links - Arbitrary File Upload

text exploit Source: Exploit-DB

# # # # # 
# Exploit Title: Job Links - Complete Job Management Script - Arbitrary File Upload
# Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.09.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://teamworktec.com/
# Software Link: https://codecanyon.net/item/job-links-complete-job-management-script/20672089
# Demo: http://teamworktec.com/demo/job-links/
# Version: N/A
# Category: Webapps
# Tested on: WiN7_x64/KaLiLinuX_x64
# CVE: N/A
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Social: @ihsansencan
# # # # #
# Description:
# 
# The vulnerability allows an Job Seeker & Employer users upload arbitrary file....
# 
# Vulnerable Source:
# 
#      changes in user profile
#      */
#     public function profileChange(Request $request){
#         $users =  User::find(Auth::id());
#         if (!empty($request->avatar)) {
#             $large_image = public_path('uploads/'.$users->avatar);
#             File::delete($large_image);
#             $file = $request->avatar;
#             $users->avatar  = $file->getClientOriginalName();
#             $users->save();
#             $file->move('uploads', $file->getClientOriginalName());
#             return $request->avatar->getClientOriginalName();
#         } else
#             return $users->avatar;
#     }
# 
#     /*
#      change Cover picture
#      */
#     public function coverChange(Request $request){
#         $users =  User::find(Auth::id());
# 
#         if (!empty($request->cover)) {
#             $large_image = public_path('uploads/'.$users->cover);
#             File::delete($large_image);
#             $file = $request->cover;
#             $users->cover  = $file->getClientOriginalName();
#             $users->save();
#             $file->move('uploads', $file->getClientOriginalName());
#             return $request->cover->getClientOriginalName();
#         } else
#             return $users->cover;
#     }
# 	
# Proof of Concept: 
# 
# http://localhost/[PATH]/profile/[UserName]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/uploads/[FILE]
# 
# Etc..
# # # # #

Application impact

Vendor	Product	Versions	Fixed
teamworktec	job_links	`-`

References

CWEs

CWE-434

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.