CVE-2023-46737

unknown
Published 2023-11-08 ยท Modified 2026-02-04
CVSS v3
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CVSS v4 NEW
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not yet in upstream
VIR risk
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Description

Cosign is a sigstore signing tool for OCI containers. Cosign is susceptible to a denial of service by an attacker controlled registry. An attacker who controls a remote registry can return a high number of attestations and/or signatures to Cosign and cause Cosign to enter a long loop resulting in an endless data attack. The root cause is that Cosign loops through all attestations fetched from the remote registry in pkg/cosign.FetchAttestations. The attacker needs to compromise the registry or make a request to a registry they control. When doing so, the attacker must return a high number of attestations in the response to Cosign. The result will be that the attacker can cause Cosign to go into a long or infinite loop that will prevent other users from verifying their data. In Kyvernos case, an attacker whose privileges are limited to making requests to the cluster can make a request with an image reference to their own registry, trigger the infinite loop and deny other users from completing their admission requests. Alternatively, the attacker can obtain control of the registry used by an organization and return a high number of attestations instead the expected number of attestations. The issue can be mitigated rather simply by setting a limit to the limit of attestations that Cosign will loop through. The limit does not need to be high to be within the vast majority of use cases and still prevent the endless data attack. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.1 and users are advised to upgrade.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
30%
Patch ETA
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Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or โ€” if you've already worked around this in production โ€” publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

โœš Propose a mitigation on Community โ†’ Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

OS impact

suse SUSE Affected 1 release
VersionStatusFixed in
โ€” Affected โ€”
debian Debian Fixed 3 releases
VersionStatusFixed in
trixie Fixed 0
sid Fixed 0
forky Fixed 0

Package impact

EcosystemPackageVulnerableFixed
golang Gogithub.com/sigstore/cosign<1.13.21.13.2
golang Gogithub.com/sigstore/cosign/v2<2.2.12.2.1
golang Gogithub.com/sigstore/cosign

References

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.