CVE-2026-102712
Description
On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first packet.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
CWEs
CWE-125
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.