CVE-2026-102759
Description
NetX Secure TLS accepts an empty application-data record without verifying its message authentication code. In `_nx_secure_verify_mac`, a decrypted application record whose length equals the negotiated MAC size is treated as valid and returns success after advancing the receive sequence number. The received MAC is never generated or compared. Empty TLS application-data records are legal, and are commonly emitted by TLS 1.0 implementations as a BEAST mitigation.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
CWEs
CWE-354
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.