CVE-2026-103435
Description
Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
CWEs
CWE-22 CWE-61 CWE-367
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.