CVE-2026-108361
Description
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Before 0.9.1, an attacker with local access could modify workload code, data, and configuration at any time after successful connection establishment. Once Evidence was successfully appraised and the connection was established, there was a window of vulnerability from the establishment of the connection to the termination of the connection where an attacker could modify the state of the workload and platform at runtime on the TLS endpoint acting as the Attester. This vulnerability was possible because Privasys/ra-tls-clients performed attestation only once in the lifetime of the connection (at connection establishment time), and the verifying peer continued to believe that the state was the same as in the initial Evidence throughout, whereas it could be stale at some point in time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.1.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
- https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/076074873117ee5ff35a7c39e02952c28de3df0c
- https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/5ccfd778132e17cb54bb1a9c7b89d57fcfea59ec
- https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/b9114d772a636ad3307957dde4bb8afe70c9b40d
- https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/security/advisories/GHSA-gg8q-mfhh-wrrc
CWEs
CWE-367
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.