CVE-2026-14480

critical

Published 2026-07-10 · Modified 2026-07-10

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CVSS v3

9.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS v4 NEW

8.7

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

VIR risk

9.9

Description

OpenPLC Runtime v3 contains an authenticated arbitrary file write vulnerability in the legacy web UI program‑upload workflow. The application stores an attacker‑supplied filename (prog_file) directly into the Programs.File database field and later uses this value as the destination path for an uploaded file without validating or restricting the path. Because Python os.path.join() honors attacker‑controlled absolute paths, an authenticated user can write arbitrary files anywhere writable by the OpenPLC webserver process. In the default build pipeline, all C++ source files within the OpenPLC runtime core directory are automatically compiled into the executable runtime binary. By writing a malicious .cpp file into this directory, an authenticated attacker can escalate the arbitrary file write into arbitrary native code execution when the operator triggers a normal program compilation and runtime start.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood

98%

Patch ETA

—

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

✚ Propose a mitigation on Community → Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

References

CWEs

CWE-73

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.