CVE-2026-15923

Description

The Zephyr SDIO subsystem function sdio_io_rw_extended_helper() in subsys/sd/sdio.c finishes transfers with a byte-I/O loop that uses size = MIN(remaining, func->cis.max_blk_size) as the per-iteration step. The value func->cis.max_blk_size is decoded directly from the SDIO card's CIS FUNCE tuple in sdio_decode_cis() and is not validated. When a card reports a maximum block size of zero, size is always 0, remaining never decreases, and the loop spins forever. The loop is reached from the public SDIO client API used by drivers, including sdio_read_fifo(), sdio_write_fifo(), and the incrementing register read/write helpers, each of which enters the loop while holding the per-card mutex func->card->lock. A card advertising max_blk_size == 0 therefore hangs the calling thread permanently on its first non-block-aligned transfer and never releases the mutex, denying service to the SDIO peripheral (and any subsystem such as Wi-Fi that depends on it) until the device is reset. The malicious value must come from the SDIO card itself, so the defect is exploitable where a removable SDIO/combo card slot lets an attacker insert a crafted or malfunctioning card (a physical attack vector); on boards with a soldered SDIO peripheral it is not attacker-influenceable. There is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact — only a permanent availability loss. The fix returns -EIO when func->cis.max_blk_size is zero, before the loop is entered.

Predictions

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

References

• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3b2f7aaee1f2ca52904c7e7f028951ba39456abd
• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4pvm-wrcp-jjf5

CWEs

CWE-835