CVE-2026-57586

high
Assigned by CNA: github_m
Published 2026-09-15 · Modified 2026-09-15
CVSS v3
8.6
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS v4 NEW
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
8.6

Description

CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
81%
Patch ETA

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

References

CWEs

CWE-78

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.