CVE-2026-63951

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix use-after-free in zram_writeback_endio A crash was observed in zram_writeback_endio due to a NULL pointer dereference in wake_up. The root cause is a race condition between the bio completion handler (zram_writeback_endio) and the writeback task. In zram_writeback_endio, wake_up() is called on &wb_ctl->done_wait after releasing wb_ctl->done_lock. This creates a race window where the writeback task can see num_inflight become 0, return, and free wb_ctl before zram_writeback_endio calls wake_up(). CPU 0 (zram_writeback_endio) CPU 1 (writeback_store) ============================ ============================ zram_writeback_slots zram_submit_wb_request zram_submit_wb_request wait_event(wb_ctl->done_wait) spin_lock(&wb_ctl->done_lock); list_add(&req->entry, &wb_ctl->done_reqs); spin_unlock(&wb_ctl->done_lock); wake_up(&wb_ctl->done_wait); zram_complete_done_reqs spin_lock(&wb_ctl->done_lock); list_add(&req->entry, &wb_ctl->done_reqs); spin_unlock(&wb_ctl->done_lock); while (num_inflight) > 0) spin_lock(&wb_ctl->done_lock); list_del(&req->entry); spin_unlock(&wb_ctl->done_lock); // num_inflight becomes 0 atomic_dec(num_inflight); // Leave zram_writeback_slots // Free wb_ctl release_wb_ctl(wb_ctl); // UAF crash! wake_up(&wb_ctl->done_wait); This patch fixes this race by using RCU. By protecting wb_ctl with rcu_read_lock() in zram_writeback_endio and using kfree_rcu() to free it, we ensure that wb_ctl remains valid during the execution of zram_writeback_endio.

Predictions

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf62f69574b19720ae5fbbbcdf24a0c4e3e05e43
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebe2cbefc86291fa7f386447a81995640df4e2fd