CVE-2026-64233

unknown
Published 2026-07-24 ยท Modified 2026-07-24
CVSS v3
โ€”
CVSS v4 NEW
โ€”
not yet in upstream
VIR risk
โ€”

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: uvc: hold opts->lock across XU walks in uvc_function_bind uvc_function_bind() walks &opts->extension_units twice without holding opts->lock: - directly, for the iExtension string-descriptor fixup loop; - indirectly, four times via uvc_copy_descriptors() (once per speed), where the helper iterates uvc->desc.extension_units (which aliases &opts->extension_units) to size and emit XU descriptors. The configfs side (uvcg_extension_make / uvcg_extension_drop, in drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c) takes opts->lock around its list_add_tail / list_del operations. A privileged userspace process that holds the configfs subtree open and writes the gadget UDC name to bind the function while concurrently rmdir()'ing an extensions subdir can race uvcg_extension_drop() against the bind-time list walks and dereference a freed struct uvcg_extension. Hold opts->lock from the start of the XU string-descriptor fixup through the last uvc_copy_descriptors() call, releasing on the descriptor-error path via a new error_unlock label that drops the lock before falling through to the existing error label. This matches the locking discipline of the configfs callbacks and removes the only remaining unsynchronised reader of the XU list during bind. Reachability: only privileged processes that can mount configfs and write to gadget UDC files can trigger the race, so this is a correctness fix rather than a security boundary.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
20%
Patch ETA
โ€”

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or โ€” if you've already worked around this in production โ€” publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

โœš Propose a mitigation on Community โ†’ Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

References

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.