CVE-2026-64594
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: initialize reset_work at allocation time ffs_fs_kill_sb() unconditionally calls cancel_work_sync() on ffs->reset_work when a functionfs instance is unmounted: ffs_data_reset(ffs); cancel_work_sync(&ffs->reset_work); However ffs->reset_work is only ever initialized via INIT_WORK() in ffs_func_set_alt() and ffs_func_disable(), and only on the FFS_DEACTIVATED path. That state is reached solely by ffs_data_closed() when the instance is mounted with the "no_disconnect" option, so for the common case (no "no_disconnect", or mounted and unmounted without ever being deactivated) reset_work is never initialized. ffs_data_new() allocates the ffs_data with kzalloc_obj() and does not initialize reset_work, and ffs_data_reset()/ffs_data_clear() do not touch it either, so reset_work.func is left NULL. cancel_work_sync() on such a work then trips the WARN_ON(!work->func) guard in __flush_work(): WARNING: kernel/workqueue.c:4301 at __flush_work+0x330/0x360, CPU#3: umount Call trace: __flush_work cancel_work_sync ffs_fs_kill_sb [usb_f_fs] deactivate_locked_super deactivate_super cleanup_mnt __cleanup_mnt task_work_run exit_to_user_mode_loop el0_svc On older kernels cancel_work_sync() on a zero-initialized work struct was a silent no-op, which hid the missing initialization. Initialize reset_work once in ffs_data_new() so it is always valid for the lifetime of the ffs_data, and drop the now-redundant INIT_WORK() calls from the two deactivation paths.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0de6ebbabfbbc9c28350283dc97d8a519d5c6dd7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3137b243c93982fe3460335e12f9247739766e10
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69faa3779250df14f51d5084f938a99809546e52
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fe895e0a9651518c4fc082487da770ff9c14c7f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba1867999dbc4085e6d8c52ac5266005b8b2bf07
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c36393b0d14e1e9783888f821ffe29381b8f46dc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb19e54ebe9baf3c3243083ade65c937339ccb7b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5631081be07f20e764d3cb5c98ac0a1004fba51
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.