CVE-2026-67330
Description
@better-auth/scim (a better-auth plugin) versions >= 1.4.0-beta.27 through <= 1.6.21 and >= 1.7.0-beta.0 through <= 1.7.0-beta.9 contain an authorization bypass. SCIM token issuance did not reject provider IDs already used by existing SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social account providers, and the same logical provider ID was used for both SCIM provider configuration and account ownership. An authenticated user could mint a SCIM token whose provider ID collided with an existing provider namespace, causing SCIM user routes to resolve account rows the token never provisioned. This allowed listing, reading, updating (including rewriting global profile/email fields without uniqueness checks), and deleting global user accounts and sessions, resulting in account takeover and unauthorized deprovisioning. Fixed in 1.6.22 and 1.7.0-beta.10 (1.7.0-rc.0).
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
CWEs
CWE-20
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.