CVE-2026-68922
Description
MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Prior to 4.5.1, find_icon_path_zip in mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/icon_analysis.py uses the Android manifest android:icon value to construct paths under the scan resource directory without rejecting traversal or verifying containment, allowing an authenticated user to upload a crafted ZIP or APK that reads a server file with an ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS suffix, copies it to DWD_DIR as the predictable name -icon., and retrieves it through the /download/ endpoint. The same behavior provides a file-existence oracle through the icon_path report field. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/62563ca429a75b3e5d47a13b958e1d2e7d5e2bbf
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/2627
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/releases/tag/v4.5.1
- https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-8j49-mmcx-4mp5
CWEs
CWE-22
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.