CVE-2026-72491
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p: fix race condition on rdma->state in trans_rdma.c The rdma->state field is modified without holding req_lock in both recv_done() and p9_cm_event_handler(), while rdma_request() accesses the same field under the req_lock spinlock. This inconsistent locking creates a race condition: - recv_done() running in softirq completion context sets rdma->state = P9_RDMA_FLUSHING without acquiring req_lock - p9_cm_event_handler() modifies rdma->state at multiple points (ADDR_RESOLVED, ROUTE_RESOLVED, ESTABLISHED, CLOSED) without req_lock - rdma_request() uses spin_lock_irqsave(&rdma->req_lock, flags) to protect the read-modify-write of rdma->state The race can cause lost state transitions: recv_done() or the CM event handler could set state to FLUSHING/CLOSED while rdma_request() is concurrently checking or modifying state under the lock, leading to the FLUSHING transition being silently overwritten by CLOSING. This corrupts the connection state machine and can cause use-after-free on RDMA request objects during teardown. Fix by adding req_lock protection to all rdma->state modifications in recv_done() and p9_cm_event_handler(), matching the pattern already used in rdma_request(). Use spin_lock_irqsave/spin_unlock_irqrestore in the CM event handler since it can race with recv_done() which runs in softirq context. Tested with a kernel module that races two threads (simulating rdma_request and recv_done/CM handler) on rdma->state with proper locking: 5.5M+ FLUSHING writes over 27M iterations with 0 lost transitions.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13bf9879b778b2f4b260b45bed18f31806120d1e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/151f8cf5b23d8a534d884432a82a6d54d5a61989
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3970a19a80de530b801b6256354d4a529a9a2d6c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cee2b8766045059d5e0b8114837b4a8efe827ac
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5424138848eb7d7d8a7196676e90a2cbf2142454
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d54894a1ee265a72d70f7cae1da6cc774cccc71
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8aadc136d8e8d8fc95d7982d213cfe2234dfcf2b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebbcbe5c0db215feecc17def06178da443f4eea6
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.