CVE-2026-80731
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header dev_validate_header() reads dev->hard_header_len directly when zero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders: if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) { memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev->hard_header_len - len); return true; } Packet send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was allocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is reconfigured so that dev->hard_header_len increases before validation, the memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write. This out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because the same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the reserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding branch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the snapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite. This path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where len < hard_header_len but len >= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree variable length L2 protocol implements header_ops->validate, and the CAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no real value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input. Drop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of dev->hard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and have no memory safety impact.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53fd7f912c0877647d6a1e1877f5ea8535ee0b4a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa6d98dd925e72fc028b26a0cbbff9d2f0601ff6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fc9816404166a90ed8d544dc52482fafffb6d9f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0f92a5731dc82556a9ae005cc35f71ab136307b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99df6b7a713f96eda206680d100b76e15f9d9b69
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74e035f07f53feca09e2352e77fccb09cad5e208
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbb30dc943a93e083f1e531bfdc6779e57de40d0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc902f52a02298c7432b2334c0c82a2885a1a8b6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b9a324e646d3657a8d9806dfbfe4f3e4066e882
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.