CVE-2026-80760
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: reject HCI_CMD_SYNC params_len above 255 mgmt_hci_cmd_sync() checks that the message length agrees with params_len but puts no upper bound on it. params_len is __le16 while the parameter length in the HCI command header is a u8: struct hci_command_hdr { __le16 opcode; __u8 plen; } __packed; hci_cmd_sync_alloc() assigns one to the other: hdr->plen = plen; if (plen) skb_put_data(skb, param, plen); so a params_len of 256 leaves plen at 0 while all 256 bytes are still appended. The frame handed to the driver then declares no parameters and carries 256 of them. On a length framed transport such as H:4 the controller takes the trailing bytes as the start of the next packet. The mgmt socket MTU is HCI_MAX_FRAME_SIZE, so params_len can reach about 1KB this way. Commit 03f1700b9b4d ("Bluetooth: MGMT: reject malformed HCI_CMD_SYNC commands") only made params_len agree with the message length, a value that fits the message but not the header field is still accepted. Reject params_len that does not fit the header field.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
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References
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
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