CVE-2026-89991

unknown
EUVD alias: EUVD-2026-80599
Assigned by CNA: linux
Published 2026-09-16 · Modified 2026-09-16
CVSS v3
CVSS v4 NEW
not yet in upstream
VIR risk

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix infinite loop in pcpu_freelist push with one possible CPU __pcpu_freelist_push() can loop forever when only one CPU is possible and an NMI re-enters pcpu_freelist_push() while the interrupted context holds that CPU's freelist lock. After the current-CPU fast path fails, the fallback loop walks cpu_possible_mask while skipping the current CPU. With CONFIG_SMP=n, or when an SMP kernel is limited to one possible CPU with nr_cpus=1 or possible_cpus=1, there are no other possible CPUs to examine. The loop therefore makes no lock acquisition attempt and can never make progress. The following stack was observed on a UP system: NMI context: pcpu_freelist_push free_htab_elem htab_map_delete_elem [perf-event BPF program] __perf_event_overflow perf_event_nmi_handler exc_nmi Interrupted context: __pcpu_freelist_push pcpu_freelist_push free_htab_elem htab_map_delete_elem [raw_tp/sys_enter BPF program] __bpf_trace_sys_enter do_syscall_64 raw_res_spin_lock() detects the same-CPU recursive acquisition and returns -EDEADLK, but the subsequent fallback loop has no candidate head on a system with one possible CPU. Restore the extra fallback head that existed before the rqspinlock conversion. Keep the current-CPU fast path, then try the other possible CPUs and finally the extra head. The additional head lets a push, which cannot fail without losing a preallocated element, make progress when the only per-CPU head is held by the interrupted context. Also check the extra head from the pop path so that nodes placed there can be reused.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
20%
Patch ETA

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.

Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here with source_tier=community-verified.

References

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.