CVE-2026-93075
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dax/fsdev: clear pgmap ops and owner on unbind fsdev_dax_probe() sets pgmap->ops = &fsdev_pagemap_ops and pgmap->owner = dev_dax, but nothing ever clears them. For a dynamic device the pgmap is devm-allocated and freed on unbind, so this is harmless. For a static device the pgmap is the shared, long-lived one owned by the dax bus (kill_dev_dax() only NULLs dev_dax->pgmap for the non-static case), and device.c's probe sets only pgmap->type, never clearing ops/owner. So after fsdev unbinds a static device the stale fsdev_pagemap_ops survives on the shared pgmap. If the device is then rebound to device_dax (MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC, which installs no ->memory_failure), or the fsdev_dax module is unloaded, a subsequent memory_failure on that pgmap dispatches through the stale -- and possibly freed -- handler. Register a devm action that clears pgmap->ops and pgmap->owner on unbind, symmetric with setting them at probe, so the pgmap carries no fsdev state once fsdev is detached.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.