CVE-2026-93657
Description
hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/30720f4fb22e5556ecbf26d2c8274ea4a9fdd238
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/3871
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/releases/tag/v0.26.2
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hickory-resolver-before-0.26.2-dnssec-validation-bypass
CWEs
CWE-347
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.