CVE-2026-97559

unknown
EUVD alias: EUVD-2026-86867
Assigned by CNA: linux
Published 2026-09-25 · Modified 2026-09-25
CVSS v3
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CVSS v4 NEW
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not yet in upstream
VIR risk
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Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fail DACL rewrite when the new DACL exceeds 64K replace_sids_and_copy_aces() and set_chmod_dacl() accumulate the size of the DACL they build in a u16. That accumulator can wrap. validate_dacl() caps num_aces at (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) / 20, i.e. 3276 for a maximally sized DACL, while each rewritten ACE can grow to sizeof(struct smb_ace) (76 bytes) once its SID is replaced with one carrying SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES sub-authorities. The worst case is therefore sizeof(struct smb_acl) + 3276 * 76 = 248984 bytes, far beyond what a u16 can hold. A wraparound is reached with 863 ACEs. After the wraparound, ndacl_ptr->size becomes meaningless and the offset will point anywhere in the ACE array. As a result, we will see corruption of the DACL, which then gets sent to the server. This is not an out-of-bounds write as the allocation now covers the worst-case expansion, so writes will always go into the buffer. Adjust the code to use a u32 internally and return -EOVERFLOW in the overflow case. The operation must be refused, because a DACL can only hold 2^16-1 bytes on the wire and larger DACLs cannot be represented. set_chmod_dacl() carries the same pattern and is fixed the same way. It only wraps once the source DACL comes within roughly 380 bytes of the 64K ceiling, but the failure mode is identical.

Predictions

Exploit likelihood
20%
Patch ETA
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Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

No mitigations published for this CVE yet.

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References

Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.

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