CVE-2026-90248
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss In tc_new_tfilter() the create branch sets tp_created = 1 before calling tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique(). When the caller loses the race (another request inserted a proto at the same chain/prio first), insert_unique() destroys the caller's own tp_new and returns the winner's proto with an extra reference. tp_created was never cleared, so the loser's errout path treated the winner's live proto as its own and called tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() on it, silently unlinking an active classifier that the winning request already advertised via RTM_NEWTFILTER. Track the outcome of the insert step in a single tri-state variable so each errout path reacts correctly: - TP_NOT_CREATED: no proto created; pursue the old path. - TP_CREATED: proto inserted successfully; same code path as before. - TP_NOT_OWNED: New - lost the insert race; tp is another request's proto (chain ref already released by tp_new's destroy) Both errout reactions are single expressions derived from the state. This fix is motivated by the Sashiko's automated review of Patch (net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers) [1][2]. The review identified the silent-unlink behaviour of an adopted proto's teardown when a request loses the tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() race. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260801125632.360365-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com [2] https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260801125632.360365-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or — if you've already worked around this in production — publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
Propose a mitigation on Community Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/219c87aeefdcc8c1caf28cc99e9b361ce7393d3a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a68e664ddf16ecae6d769d6a2eb356f8abab75c9
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbe2fd6d77df630356185406a97317f6aa6a92cf
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bee2208276c8e0e40a249ffdcf6e5434a79a847c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4e359b3608a0e184bbe8d61a5c3b50d0831c44a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc8b33b819cb02a75936940c120aa669ad89942d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df02b6dc136af45e92ee4c86f4aa6c9a60790b1e
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.